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Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of
Comparative Fault
David W'. Robertson*
I. THE 1996 LEGISLATION AND THE PROVISIONS THEREBY REPLACED
Acts 3, 15, and 65 of the Louisiana Legislature's First Extraordinary Session
of 1996 effected revolutionary changes in the law of comparative fault. This
article analyzes those changes, criticizes the harshness of some of them, and
predicts judicial reactions to some of the harsher provisions.'
A. Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2323 and 2324
Act 3 of 1996, which took effect on April 16, 1996, amended Louisiana
Civil Code article 2323 to read as follows:
Art. 2323. Comparative fault
A. In any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death,
or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or
contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be determined, regardless
of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and
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regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by
statute, including but not limited to the provisions of R.S. 23:1032,2 or
that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable.
If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or
persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in
proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the
person suffering the injury, death, or loss.
B. The provisions of Paragraph A shall apply to any claim for
recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or
legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs A and B, if a
person suffers injury, death, or loss as a result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor,
his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced.
Before the 1996 changes, Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 was as set forth
below.
Former Art. 2323:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages,
its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury, death or loss
as the result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the
fault of another person or persons, the claim for .damages shall not
thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages recoverable shall be
reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence
attributable to the person suffering the injury, death or loss.
Act 3 of 1996 also amended Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 to read as
follows:
Art. 2324. Liability as solidary or joint and divisible obligation
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional
or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage
caused by such act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability
for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and
divisible obligation. A joint tortfeasor shall not be liable for more than
his degree of fault and shall not be solidarily liable with any other
person for damages attributable to the fault of such other person,
including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such
other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, immunity by
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 confers a general immunity from tort liability upon
employers covered by the workers' compensation system.
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statute or otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided
in R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or
reasonably ascertainable.
C. Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is
effective against all joint tortfeasors.
Before the 1996 change, Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 was as set forth
below.
Former Art. 2324.
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional
or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage
caused by such act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, or as
otherwise provided by law, then liability for damages caused by two or
more persons shall be solidary only to the extent necessary for the
person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages; however, when the amount of recovery has been
reduced in accordance with the preceding Article, a judgment debtor
shall not be liable for more than the degree of his fault to a judgment
creditor to whom a greater degree of fault has been attributed. Under
the provisions of this Article, all parties shall enjoy their respective
rights of indemnity and contribution. Except as described in Paragraph
A of this Article, or as otherwise provided by law, and hereinabove, the
liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint,
divisible obligation, and a joint tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable
with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other
person, including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless
of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, or
immunity by statute or otherwise.
C. Interruption ofprescription against one joint tortfeasor, whether
the obligation is considered joint and divisible or solidary, is effective
against all joint tortfeasors. Nothing in this Subsection shall be
construed to affect in any manner the application of the provisions of
R.S. 40:1299.41(G).
B. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1812(C)
Act 65 of 1996, which took effect on May 9, 1996, amended Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 1812(C). The changes were quantitatively small and
few enough to permit using the following quotation to show both the former and
post-1996 versions of the article. As the provision is formatted below, language
deleted in 1996 is in brackets and language added in 1996 is in italics.
1998]
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Art. 1812. Special verdicts
C. In cases to recover damages for injury, death, or loss, the court
[may] at the request ofanyparty shall submit to the jury special written
questions inquiring as to:
(I) Whether a party from whom damages are claimed, or the person
for whom such person is legally responsible, was at fault, and, if so:
(a) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and, if so:
(b) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage.
(2)(a) If appropriate under the facts adduced at trial, whether
another [person, whether party or not] party or nonparty, other than the
person suffering injury, death, or loss, was at fault, and, if so:
(i) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and, if so:
(ii) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage.
(b) For purposes of this Paragraph, nonparty means a person
alleged by any party to be at fault, including but not limited to:
(i) A person who has obtained a release from liability from the
person suffering injury, death, or a loss.
(ii) A person who exists but whose identity is unknown.
(iii) A person who may be immune fom suit because of immunity
granted by statute.
(3) If appropriate, whether there was negligence attributable to any
party claiming damages, and, if so:
(a) Whether such negligencewas a legal cause of the damages, and,
if so:
(b) The degree of such negligence, expressed in percentage.
(4) The total amount of special damages and the total amount of
general damages sustained as a result of the injury, death, or loss,
expressed in dollars, and, if appropriate, the total amount of exemplary
damages to be awarded.
C. The New Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1104
Act 15 of 1996, which went into effect on June 18, 1996, created a new
provision, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1104, providing as follows.
§ 1104. Quantification of employer fault
In a suit brought pursuant to R.S. 23:1101,- the fault of persons
immune from suit under R.S. 23:1032 shall be assessed as a percentage
3. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101 provides that an employee covered by workers'
compensation remains entitled to sue a nonemployer ("third person") in tort. It also provides that
an employer or workers' compensation carrier who has paid or become obligated to pay workers'
compensation benefits can sue the third person in tort to recover those benefits.
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of the aggregate fault of all persons causing or contributing to the
employee's injury, and the fault so assessed shall not be reallocated to
any other person or party. The recovery had in such a suit by the
employer or any other person having paid or having become obligated
to pay compensation shall be reduced by the fault so assessed. This
reduction is in addition to but not duplicative of any reduction made
pursuant to Civil Code articles 2323, 2324, and 2324.24 and R.S.
23:1101(B).s
II. WHAT THE 1996 LEGISLATION SAYS ON ITS FACE-A PARAPHRASE
No matter what the theory of liability being asserted by the plaintiff, a
percentage assessment of fault is to be made as to each person or entity shown
to have been a cause in fact and a legal cause of the injuries in suit, regardless
of whether the person or entity is a party to the lawsuit and regardless of any
immunity to which the person or entity may be entitled. The plaintiff is entitled
to full damages from any defendant shown to have been an intentional tortfeasor.
The exposure of any other liable defendant is limited to that individual
defendant's percentage-fault share of the total damages. Solidary liability is
abolished except among those who commit or conspire to commit intentional or
willful harm. An employer or workers' compensation carrier who has paid
workers' compensation benefits to the victim remains entitled to some recoup-
ment of such payments, but this recovery must be reduced to reflect both the
employer's fault and (other)6 comparative-fault reductions in the employee's tort
recovery.
4. Louisiana Civil Code article 2324.2 is captioned "Reduction ofrecovery" and reads as follows:
A. When the recovery of damages by a person suffering injury, death, or loss is
reduced in some proportion by application of Article 2323 or 2324 and there is a legal
or conventional subrogation, then the subrogee's recovery shall be reduced in the same
proportion as the subrogor's recovery.
B. Nothing herein precludes such persons and legal or conventional subrogees from
agreeing to a settlement which would incorporate a different method or proportion of
subrogee recovery for amounts paid by the legal or conventional subrogee under the
Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act, R.S. 23:1021, et seq.
5. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101(B) provides as follows:
B. Any person having paid or having become obligated to pay compensation under the
provisions of this Chapter may bring suit against such third person to recover any amount
which he has paid or becomes obligated to pay as compensation to such employee or his
dependents. The recovery allowed herein shall be identical in percentage to the recovery
of the employee or his dependents against the third person and, where the recovery of the
employee is decreased as a result of comparative negligence, the recovery of the person
who has paid compensation or has become obligated to pay compensation shall be reduce
by the same percentage.
6. The parenthetical "other" is necessary because the employer's fault will occasionally reduce
the compensation lien in cases in which the employee's tort recovery against the third party suffers
no comparative-fault reductions. See discussion in Section III-C.
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III. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE ILLUSTRATING THE APPARENT MEANING OF THE
1996 LEGISLATION
A. The Facts of the Hypothetical Case
A parcel-delivery service sends its employee, Porter, to Aaron's house to
drop off a package that Aaron has been expecting for weeks. Aaron is under
psychiatric care for a condition manifesting itself in frequent fits of rage.
Porter's Employer knows of Aaron's condition and volatility but neglects to warn
Porter. When Aaron complains about the late arrival of the package, Porter's
response is offhand and flippant. Aaron flies into a rage and attacks Porter,
beating him severely. During the attack a Mysterious Stranger arrives at the
scene and helps Aaron batter Porter. The Mysterious Stranger, whose identity
is never discovered, then disappears.
Aaron is usually able to control his temper with the aid of prescription
medications. However, on the occasion in question, Aaron is taking the wrong
medicine because of a mistake made by the Drug Store from which he obtains
his supply.
Porter sues Aaron, alleging battery, and Drug Store, alleging negligence. If
any party requests it, the trial judge must submit the issues of Employer's and
Stranger's percentages of fault to the jury. (Drug Store will definitely request
it.) The jury finds that Porter was somewhat to blame7 for his own injuries-he
should have been more polite-and that Aaron, Drug Store, Employer, and
Mysterious Stranger were also at fault in bringing about the injuries, further
specifying:
Porter's total damages: $100,000
Porter's negligence: 10%
Aaron's fault: 20%
Drug Store's fault: 10%
Employer's fault: 10%
Stranger's fault: 50%
At the time of trial, Employer has paid $20,000 in weekly workers' compensa-
tion benefits.' Employer intervenes in Porter's lawsuit to assert its compensation
lien.9
7. In the paper, attributions of "blame" "fault," or "negligence" mean that the party in question
was guilty of legally relevant fault that was a cause in fact and a legal cause of the injuries in suit.
8. I am avoiding the additional complexity that might ensue if the employer had paid
medical expenses in addition to weekly benefits. See generally Malone & Johnson, supra
note I, at 266-72.
9. There has been significant debate about the proper characterization of the employer's right
to recoupment of some or all of its compensation payments from the employee's tort recovery against
a nonemployer tortfeasor. See Malone & Johnson, supra note 1, at 281-98. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2324.2 (added in 1989) characterizes it as a legal subrogation. I would like to steer clear of
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B. Determining Plaintiff's Rights Against the Defendants
As to Porter's rights against Aaron and Drug Store, the dictates of the 1996
legislation, while quite surprising, seem relatively clear. The effect of the
judgment against the two defendants should be that Porter can recover the full
$100,000 from Aaron and that he is also entitled to recover $10,000 from Drug
Store. Of course, this does not mean that Porter can collect $110,000.0 The
judgment should provide that Drug Store is individually liable for $10,000, that
Aaron is solidarily liable with Drug Store for that $10,000, and that Aaron has
an additional individual liability of $90,000. As will be demonstrated in Section
VII-A, Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(A) clearly authorizesimposing solidary
liability upon Aaron in this situation.
An interesting question respecting the interpretation of the 1996 legislation
arises if we posit that Porter settles with Drug Store during the course of the trial
and continues the proceedings against Aaron." Louisiana Civil Code article
2323(C) can and should probably be read to indicate that Aaron is entitled to no
reduction in his liability to reflect the settlement with Drug Store. Read literally,
that is what Article 2323(C) says.' 2 Moreover, the predecessor law may well
have denied intentional tortfeasors any reduction in their liability to reflect partial
settlements entered into by the plaintiff with other tortfeasors. 3 Nothing in the
the debate about the appropriateness of that characterization, and have been told that "compensation
lien" is an acceptably neutral term.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101 (D), the compensation lien issues are tried to the judge
out of the jury's presence. I suppose that theoretically the judge could arrive at different percentage-
fault assignments than the jury. I am going to assume that there would rarely be any reason for the
judge to add that complication to the mix.
10. Every jurisdiction has some version of a "one satisfaction" rule that is generally aimed at
precluding a judgment creditor from collecting more than the total amount of damages specified in
the judgment. See generally McDermott v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 218-21, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1470-
72 (1994); cf. Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hosp., 634 So. 2d 331 (La. 1994).
11. Conceivably Aaron may benefit from a settlement between Porter and Drug Store. But Drug
Store won't have any interest in whether Porter has settled with Aaron or Stranger. See discussion
in Section VIII-C.
12. However, reading Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(C) literally is problematic. Its obvious
intended meaning is that a plaintiff who prevails against an intentional tortfeasor suffers no reduction
in recovery to reflect the plaintiff's own negligence. Read literally, though, it would say that a
negligent plaintiff suffers no comparative-fault reduction of any kind-not even as against the
negligent and strictly liable defendants-in any suit in which an intentional tortfeasor is held liable.
That reading is dubious, particularly when it is noted that the hypothesized bonus for managing to
include an intentional tortfeasor in the mix would by the literal terms of the provision be confined
to negligent plaintiffs and unavailable to innocent plaintiffs.
13. From its modem inception in Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964), the settlement-credit rule-the rule allowing Tortfeasor A to reduce its liability to the plaintiff
to reflect the fact of a partial settlement between plaintiff and Tortfeasor B-has been based on the
theory that, by settling with B, the plaintiff has deprived A of the right of contribution A would
otherwise have had against B. Probably, though, intentional tortfeasors have never had a right of
contribution against co-tortfeasors, at least not against "merely" negligent ones such as Drug Store
1998]
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background or language of the 1996 legislation indicates any intention to alter
the law in that respect.
Another interesting question will arise if we posit that Porter appeals the
decision of the trial court and secures a determination by the court of appeal that
the attribution of any fault to him was manifestly or clearly erroneous."4 As we
will see in Section V-D, in similar situations under prior law the courts have
used a "ratio approach" whereby the fault assessments against the other parties
are adjusted proportionately so that they total 100%. Thus, Aaron's assessment
would become 20/90ths (22.22%); Drug Store's and Employer's would each
become 10/90ths (11.11%); and Stranger's would become 50/90ths (55.56%).
On these assessments-which would not alter Porter's rights against Aar-
on-Porter would recover $11,111 from Drug Store.
I see nothing in the 1996 legislation that would preclude the continued use
of the ratio approach in the present context-to effect judicial correction of a
factually mistaken percentage assessment against one of the parties-and it seems
the only sensible alternative. All the other conceivable alternatives are
demonstrably worse. Remanding the case to the trier of fact for new assessments
of the fault of the participants other than Porter would be an expensive and
cumbersome maneuver, virtually unthinkable in the Louisiana scheme of things.
For the appellate court itself to readjust the percentages of the participants other
than Porter on a fact-review basis would offend well-established limitations on
appellate fact review.' s Anything else the court of appeal might do would
entail a purely arbitrary and essentially random reassignment of the now-missing
10% to one or more of the participants. If the court of appeal-having
in our hypothetical case. Cf. Maraist & Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, supra note 1, at 282 (asserting
that there "is no authoritative law in Louisiana on the issue of whether one intentional tortfeasor may
obtain contribution from another"). Note, however, that the current draft of the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability (Proposed Final Draft, 1988) calls for
contribution on behalf of intentional tortfeasors and persons acting in concert against each other as
well as against purely negligent tortfeasors. See § 28B, Illustration 3, and § 32, Comment I. Note
also the very recent Soileau v. Ardoin, 707 So. 2d 1386 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), holding in effect
that intentional tortfeasors do have contribution rights against each other.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that there is no reason for doubting that a negligent tortfeasor
is entitled to contribution from (and therefore to a settlement credit reflecting the plaintiff's having
agreed to release) an intentional tortfeasor. See Jarreau v. City of Baton Rouge, 602 So. 2d 1124,
1126 n.3 (La. App. lstCir. 1992) (stating that it would normally be appropriate to reflect a plaintiff's
settlement with an intentional tortfeasor by giving the negligent defendant a reduction reflecting the
intentional tortfeasor's percentage of fault).
14. Under Clement v. Frey, 666 So. 2d 607 (La. 1996), appellate review of percentage-fault
assignments is limited by a rule of deference whereby an assignment that is manifestly too low shall
be raised, but only to the lowest reasonable percentage, and an assignment that is manifestly too high
shall be lowered, but only to the highest reasonable percentage. See David W. Robertson, Allocating
Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers in Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict
Liability Cases, 57 La. L. Rev. 1079, 1084-85 (1997). In our hypothetical case, we are assuming
that the court of appeal believes that it was manifestly erroneous to assign any fault to Porter.
15. See supra note 14.
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determined that Porter was innocent-holds that Porter's recovery against Drug
Store remains limited to 10%, the fault that was manifestly erroneously allocated
to Porter will have been effectively reassigned right back to Porter. On the other
hand, if the court of appeal holds that Porter's recovery against Drug store now
becomes 20%, the fault mistakenly allocated to Porter will have been arbitrarily
reassigned to Drug Store.
C. Determining the Amount of the Employer's Compensation Lien 6
Recall that our hypothesized judgment in Porter's case against Aaron and
Drug Store provides that Drug Store is individually liable for $10,000, that
Aaron is solidarily liable with Drug Store for that $10,000, and that Aaron has
an additional individual liability of $90,000. We must now try to work the
compensation lien into that judgment. Solution of this tricky problem begins by
noting the requirement set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1103(A)(1)"'
that "damages shall be so apportioned in the judgment that the claim of the
employer for the compensation actually paid shall take precedence over that of
the injured employee."'" In other words, the employer gets the first bite.
The next logical step takes us to the new Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1104, which provides that the compensation lien is to be reduced by the "fault
... assessed" against the employer and that such reduction "is in addition to but
not duplicative of any reduction made pursuant to Civil Code Articles 2323,
2324, and 2324.2 and R.S. 23:1101(B)." What can this mean? In trying to
16. This portion of this Article was not covered in the April 3-4 Professional Development
Seminar (see supra note 1) and hence has not benefitted from the scrutiny of Galligan, Johnson, and
Maraist. But I have reason to believe that Johnson disagrees with parts of my analysis.
17. The full text of La. R.S. 23:1103(AXI) (1998) is as follows:
In the event that the employer or the employee or his dependent becomes party plaintiff
in a suit against a third person, as provided in R.S. 23:1102 [sic], and damages are
recovered, such damages shall be so apportioned in the judgment that the claim of the
employer for the compensation actually paid shall take precedence over that of the injured
employee or his dependent; and if the damages are not sufficient or are sufficient only to
reimburse the employer for the compensation which he has actually paid, such damages
shall be assessed solely in his favor; but if the damages are more than sufficient to so
reimburse the employer, the excess shall be assessed in favor of the injured employee or
his dependent, and upon payment thereof to the employee or his dependent, the liability
of the employer for compensation shall cease for such part of the compensation due,
computed at six percent per annum, and shall be satisfied by such payment. The
employer's credit against its future compensation obligation shall be reduced by the
amount of attorney fees and court costs paid by the employer in the third party suit.
The reference to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1102 is presumably a typographical error; the
intention was surely to refer to Louisiana Revised Statues 23:1101.
18. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1103(AXI) describes the compensation lien for prior payments
as coming from "damages [that) are recovered," whereas it describes the future-compensation credit
as kicking in "upon payment [of damages] to the employee." The issue of whether, and to what
extent, the future-compensation credit should reflect the effects of the employer's fault and the other
comparative-fault reductions the plaintiff's recovery may have suffered is not treated in this article.
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figure it out, it may be useful to begin by simplifying the present hypothetical.
Let's ignore Drug Store for the moment and suppose that Porter recovers
$100,000 from Aaron as an intentional tortfeasor. In this situation, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1104 seems to call for cutting the employer's compensation
lien from $20,000 to $18,000 to reflect the 10% fault assessment against the
employer. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2323, 2324, 2324.2, and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1101(B) call for no further reduction in this situation,
because they are all keyed to reductions in tort damages being suffered by the
employee, here zero.
Now let's ignore Aaron for the moment and suppose that Porter recovers
$10,000 from the negligent Drug Store. Again, Louisiana Revised Statutes
23.1104 requires the compensation lien must be reduced by 10% to reflect the
employer's fault. In addition, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101(B) calls for
a further reduction, providing as follows (italics supplied):
Any person having paid dr having become obligated to pay compensa-
tion under the provisions of this Chapter may bring suit against such
third person to recover any amount which he has paid or becomes
obligated to pay as compensation to such employee or his dependents.
The recovery allowed herein shall be identical in percentage to the
recovery of the employee or his dependents against the third person
and, where the recovery of the employee is decreased as a result of
comparative negligence, the recovery of the person who has paid
compensation or has become" obligated to pay compensation shall be
reduced by the same percentage.
The two italicized phrases seem contradictory. The first italicized phrase would
indicate that the compensation lien should be 10% of $20,000 = $2000. (Porter
is recovering only 10% of his damages from Drug Store.) The second italicized
phrase would indicate that the compensation lien should be 80% of $20,000 =
$16,000. (The 80% results from reducing the lien to reflect the employer's 10%
fault and Porter's 10% fault.)
Which is correct? It seems to me that the first phrase must control. If we
let the second phrase control, the command of the first phrase-"shall be
identical"-is violated, whereas allowing the first phrase to control does not
entail a frontal violation of the second phrase, but merely makes that phrase
redundant. If we make the assumption that the first phrase controls, the
reduction set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101(B) swallows up the
other potential reductions enumerated in the new Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1104; they all become "duplicative" of Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1101(B). On this reading, the new Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1104
clarifies the meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101(B): In circumstanc-
es in which the law of comparative fault imposes reductions on the employee's
tort recovery, the employer recovers the same percentage of the compensation
lien that the employee recovers of the tort damages.
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We are now ready to try to work the compensation lien into the judgment
against Aaron and Drug Store. If our analysis is correct thus far, there are two
controlling principles: (a) employer should not recoup more than $18,000-this
principle results from the command of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1104 to
penalize Employer for his fault; (b) the compensation lien should not swallow
more than $2000 of Porter's recovery against Drug Store. This principle results
from the command of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1101(B) that the compensa-
tion lien "shall be identical in percentage to the recovery of the employee." The
judgment should therefore set forth a compensation lien of $18,000, with the
proviso that no more than $2000 of the lien can be satisfied from the judgment
against Drug Store.
IV. SOME RADICAL FEATURES OF THE NEW LAW
From the viewpoint of traditional torts thinking, some radical changes are
seen in the ways in which the 1996 legislation seems to limit Porter's rights
against Drug Store. It will reveal the radical nature of these limits if we assume
that Aaron is uninsured and insolvent. Such an assumption is realistic;
intentional tortfeasors are rarely insured against such liability, and they are
frequently judgment-proof.
Looking at Porter's case against Drug Store: on its face, what the legislation
does is to charge Porter with his own percentage of fault, his Employer's
percentage of fault, Aaron's percentage of fault, and Mysterious Stranger's
percentage of fault. How could the legislature have believed that imputing the
fault of all of these entities to the plaintiff-without imputing any of that fault
to the defendant Drug Store-is fair or wise? After all, the trier of fact has
authoritatively determined that Porter and Drug Store were equally at fault. I
believe the answer lies in an implicit assumption that the percentage-fault
findings can sensibly be treated as though they were factual causation assign-
ments. That is, I believe the legislature was implicitly equating the finding that
Drug Store was 10% at fault with a finding that Drug Store was causally
responsible for only 10% of the damages. Such thinking then leads to the
rhetorical question, "why should a defendant with only 10% of the responsibility
bear more than 10% of the damages?"' 9
One might well answer with another rhetorical question, "why should a
plaintiff with only 10% of the responsibility bear more than 10% of the
damages?" But a better answer is to insist on a closer and more careful analysis
of the nature of percentage-fault assessments, whereby it is readily apparent that
the 10% findings against Porter and Drug Store were not findings of causal
19. Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 384-85, arguably falls under the sway
of such rhetoric in stating: "[Full solidary liability after 1980] left some defendants scratching their
heads, wondering, 'How, if I am only 20% at fault, can I be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages?'
The answer was that 100% liability upon a joint tortfeasor simply was a fact of life in a legal world
in transition."
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responsibility, but of comparative culpability vis-i-vis one another and vis-i-vis
the other culpable actors. A moment's reflection will make it clear that
percentage-fault findings are not-indeed, cannot conceivably be-factual
causation findings.
As everyone knows, under traditional torts thinking it is appropriate to divide
damages on the basis of factual causation in any case in which such a division
is feasible. For example, the court in Buccola v. Marchese0 found that injuries
flowing from car wrecks in July and November were separate and assessed
separate damages to each.2 Clearly that is not what is going on in Porter's
case. In Porter's case, the faulty conduct of Aaron, Drug Store, Employer, and
Stranger 2 -- and of Porter himself-combined to cause the same $100,000
injury. The assignment of 10% fault to Drug Store does not mean that Drug
Store caused only 10% of Porter's injuries. Drug Store caused all of it, just as
Porter himself did, and just as the other entities did, too.
Once we have reminded ourselves that the percentage-fault assignments are
not factual-causation shares, the ways in which the 1996 legislation limits
Porter's rights against Drug Store are seen as quite remarkable. The most radical
change is the treatment of Stranger's fault. Despite the lack of any traditional
basis for imputing Stranger's fault to Porter, that is effectively what the 1996
legislation commands. (It may parenthetically heighten the impression of
strangeness to note that if Porter should later track down and sue Stranger, the
previous adjudication of Stranger's fault would be treated as meaningless.
Plainly Stranger can in no way be bound by any feature of an adjudication to
which he was never in any sense a party.)
The potential harshness of the 1996 legislation's limits on victims' rights can
be even more dramatically highlighted by making only a slight change in the
facts of the hypothetical case. Suppose that Porter was innocent, i.,e., that he
behaved properly and politely in response to Aaron's complaints and did nothing
to provoke the attack. In such a case, one may assume that the trier of fact
would assign no fault percentage to Porter, so that the findings of fact might
have been as follows:
Porter's total damages: $100,000
Porter's negligence: 0%
*Aaron's fault: 20%
20. 599 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
21. See also Perez v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 458 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Williams
v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 418 So. 2d 13 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1982).
22. With perfect hindsight, one might be able to separate the injuries inflicted by Stranger from
those inflicted by Aaron. But that factual apportionment would affect only Stranger's liability-each
of the others caused the entirety of the harms, because if any of them had behaved properly, there
would have been no affray for Stranger to join. Moreover, it would generally be impossible as a
practical matter to segregate the wounds inflicted by Stranger from those inflicted by Aaron. And
there would be absolutely no need to do so here, when Stranger, who is the only participant who
might conceivably benefit from such segregation, is utterly unaffected by the lawsuit.
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Drug Store's fault: 10%
Employer's fault: 10%
Mysterious Stranger's fault: 60%
In this situation, the 1996 legislation still seems to call for limiting Drug Store's
liability to $10,000. Harking back for a moment to the rhetorical question
approach to issues like this, why should Porter-an innocent victim, one who has
been "responsible for" none of his damages-ultimately bear the responsibility
for 90% of them?
One further feature of the 1996 legislation deserves explicit attention. In
early comparative-fault thinking, it was regarded as improper to assign
percentage fault to anyone except parties to the lawsuit and settling
tortfeasors. 3 Nowadays, it is no longer regarded as unusual for particular
jurisdictions to go further and require or permit assigning percentage fault to
nonparties generally. But in requiring courts to assign percentage fault even to
nonparties whose "identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable," the 1996
amendment to Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 seems to put Louisiana at the
extreme edge of this spectrum. The current draft of the American Law
Institute's proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
handles the subject of solidary liability ("joint and several liability" in standard
American parlance) by setting out five different alternative systems-one
retaining full solidarity, one abolishing solidarity, and three hybrids or amalgams.
The proposed Restatement alternative abolishing solidary liability (except among
intentional tortfeasors) describes a system closelyresemblingpost-1996 Louisiana
law. But even in such a system the Restaters are adamantly against allowing the
quantification of nonparties who cannot be identified. Comment (f) to
Restatement section 28B states:
A nonparty who is not sufficiently identified as to be subject to service
of process or discovery should not be submitted to the fact finder for
assignment of responsibility. A minimum condition for an assignment
of responsibility to nonparties is that the nonparties be sufficiently
identified that they could be joined in the suit (regardless of whether
personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction would exist), or that
discovery could be obtained from the nonparty.
In its zeal to encourage defendants to try to saddle the plaintiff with the fault
percentages of virtually everyone in the vicinity of the accident, including
Mysterious Strangers, the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 more than lived
up to its name.
23. This was the position of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which is reprinted as an
appendix in Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 40 La. L Rev. 289, 419-36 (1980).
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V. JUDICIAL MITIGATIONS OF CERTAIN ARGUABLY RADICAL FEATURES OF
PREvious COMPARATIVE FAULT STATUTES
A. Using Duty/Risk Reasoning on a Selective Basis To Permit Full Recovery
by Negligent Plaintiffs
Before the comparative fault regime went into effect in 1980, the rule was
that the plaintiff's negligence barred recovery. This total-bar rule was perceived
as harsh, and courts frequently found ways around it. One way was to hold that
the defendant's duty-the rule of law violated by the defendant-fully embraced
the risk of the victim's negligence. For example, the supreme court in Rue v.
State Department of Highways held that the contributory negligence of a motorist
in allowing her vehicle to stray off the paved roadway onto the shoulder did not
bar her recovery for injuries caused by defendant's negligent maintenance of the
shoulder because "the Highway Department's duty to maintain a safe shoulder
encompasses the foreseeable risk that for any number of reasons, including
simple inadvertence, a motorist might find himself travelling on, or partially on,
the shoulder."24 Another way was to hold that the rule of law violated by the
plaintiff did not extend to the risk presented by the defendant's negligence. For
example, Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co. held that a motorist's duty not to stop
and block the road did not extend to the risk of being struck from behind by a
large and inattentively driven truck.25
I have argued that these techniques should have disappeared once the
comparative fault regime went into effect.26 Briefly put, the argument against
their retention is this: They were not "normal" or "mainstream" duty/risk (or,
to say the same thing another way, legal cause) determinations, but rather what
have come to be called "ameliorative" doctrines or techniques, with the adjective
signaling the perception that they were invented solely for the purpose of
avoiding the perceived harshness of the old total-bar contributory negligence
rule.2 One can tell that Rue was not "mainstream" by recalling the hundreds
of cases in which entirely foreseeable and typical victim fault barred recovery
(and by noting that nowadays motorists whose negligence combines with that of
the Highway Department to cause their injuries regularly have their recoveries
reduced by their percentages of fault).2" One can tell that Laird was not
"mainstream" by realizing that Mr. Laird would certainly have been held liable
to an injured passenger in the Laird vehicle; in that circumstance, no court would
have said that the large truck was the sole legal cause of the accident. Clearly
Rue and Laird were instances of the ameliorative doctrines or techniques. The
24. 372 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La. 1979).
25. 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714, 718-19 (1972).
26. See Robertson, Ruminations, supra note 1, at 1359-64.
27. See generally David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 413-28 (2d ed. 1998).
28. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Dep't ofTransp. & Dev., 648 So. 2d 898 (La. 1995) (25% fault
assigned to driver, 75% to highway department).
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most famous member of the large family of ameliorative doctrines and
techniques was the last clear chance doctrine. It is almost universally accepted
that the last clear chance doctrine must disappear whenever a comparative fault
regime-particularly, a "pure" comparative fault regime like Louisi-
ana's -- goes into effect. The other members of the "ameliorative" family
should be no different.
Despite the foregoing argument, perceptive and persuasive analysts,
including Alston Johnson, 0 have argued for the continued viability of the
duty/risk ameliorative techniques in the comparative-fault era. Some decisions
of the supreme court may be read as suggesting that the techniques are no longer
part of the law.3 But in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, the court held that the
negligence of one injured by a defective product will reduce recovery only
"[w]here the threat of a reduction in recovery will provide consumers with an
incentive to use a product carefully, without ... drastically reduc[ing] the
manufacturer's incentive to make a safer product."32 Arguably, the quoted
language from Bell endorses both the Rue and Laird techniques. See also Turner
v. New Orleans Public Service Inc., in which the court held that pedestrians'
negligence reduces recovery in actions against negligent motorists but stated:
Care should be taken, however, to note that we do not hold that the
victim's fault shall always reduce his compensation. There are cases in
our literature in which injured persons have been allowed recovery
(cases in which the contributory negligence of the plaintiff did not
prohibit recovery). Some of those cases (which we do not propose to
specify) should produce the same result today. See Bell v. Jet Wheel
Blast, where we held that Bell's recovery should not be diminished
because of his contributory negligence. The legitimate objectives of
accident law, in all probability, will require us to reach a similar
conclusion in some future cases.33
The court has never repudiated the quoted language. 4 Thus, the Louisiana
29. In a "pure" comparative fault system, the claimant may be assigned a percentage of fault
ranging from 0% to 100%, and atno point short of an assignment of 100% is there a bar to recovery.
A claimant who is assigned 99% of the fault in a particular incident recovers 1% of his loss.
Louisiana's is the pure system. Some states have opted for "modified" systems, under which a
claimant's recovery will be barred when it reaches a particular percentage, generally 50% or 51%.
30. See generally Johnson, supra note 1, at 319. It is not completely clear that Johnson favored
the retention of the technique used in Laird-whereby the victim's duty would sometimes be held
to exclude the risk of a particular tortfeasor's fault. But see id. at 325 n.27 (arguably an oblique
approval of the technique).
31. See generally Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 374-76.
32. 462 So. 2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985).
33. 476 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. 1985).
34. Far from it. In Landry v. State, 495 So. 2d 1284, 1289 (La. 1986), the court quoted the
relevant passage of Turner, fully endorsing it. See also id. at 1290 (endorsing "applying the
comparative fault principles in strict liability cases on a case by case basis"); Sistler v. Liberty Mut.
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Supreme Court remains on record as holding open the possibility of selective
forgiveness of victim negligence through duty/risk reasoning.
B. Using Duty/Risk Reasoning On a Selective Basis to Bar Negligent
Plaintiffs from Recovering
The "flip side" of the use of duty/risk reasoning to forgive negligent
plaintiffs is the use of such reasoning to bar certain negligent victims from
recovery. Here again, the legitimacy of using duty/risk thinking to supplant or
override the apparent legislative command is debatable.' s In simple terms, the
argument against the technique is that any holding to the effect that the victim's
negligence takes him beyond the scope of the defendant's duty (or, to say the
same thing another way, that the victim's negligence was the sole legal cause of
his injury) amounts to bringing the contributory negligence doctrine back into the
law, thereby negating the legislature's choice of the pure comparative fault
approach. 6 But let the debate rage as it will, there is no doubt that the courts
sometimes use this technique to defeat recovery." For example, the court in
Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1113 (La. 1990) ('[w]hen a court finds victim fault, comparative fault
principles are applied on a case-by-case basis").
35. This matter is debated in Robertson, Ruminations, supra note 1, at 1364-71, and Johnson,
supra note i, at 334-37. For more recent commentary, see David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary
of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, 58 La. L Rev. 1, 29-32 (1997); Robertson,
supra note 14, at 1112-13.
36. The current draft of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment (Proposed Final
Draft, 1998) of Liability proposes a pure comparative fault system (see § 7), but (at § 3, Illustration
7) is agnostic on the legitimacy of courts' holding in particular cases that "unforeseeably egregious"
conduct by a victim constitutes a superseding cause of the harm, leading to the conclusion that the
defendant's negligence was not a legal cause of the harm. I contend that the technique is illegitimate.
If the only thing that makes the victim's injury unforeseeable was the egregiousness of the victim's
fault, the core command of the pure percentage fault system is that the victim takes a very high
percentage assignment but is not barred.
On the other hand, legal-cause arguments focusing on any other unusual feature of the
situation-other than the egregiousness of the victim's fault-are entirely compatible with the pure
comparative fault system. This distinction-between "unforeseeable egregiousness" and
"unforeseeable for any other reason"--is only moderately difficult to grasp and to test. In Freeman,
discussed in the text immediately following infra note 37, a physician was out walking his dog late
at night when his pager summoned him quickly to the hospital where he worked. He had to go home
firsL The faulty gate of his apartment complex had locked him out. In his hurry to answer the
summons, he tried to scale the security fence and was injured. The court held that the physician's
negligent effort to gain entry made his injuries unforeseeable. That holding seems wrong; it seems
to be contributory negligence in modem clothing. How can we tell it was wrong? One technique
is to suppose a situation in which no one would say the physician's effort to gain entry was
negligent-say he was fleeing a mugger or a dangerous dog. Would the court say that such an injury
to a tenant was an unforeseeable result of having a gate that sometimes locked tenants out? If you
agree with me that the answer is probably not, then it becomes tolerably clear that the Freeman
holding turned on the victim's fault, not on some other aspect of the situation, and that makes it
wrong in a pure comparative fault system.
37. The example in the Restatement draft is this: "A negligently spills gasoline on the street. B
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Freeman v. Julia Place Limited Partners held that a tenant's negligence in trying
to scale a fence when the defendant landlord's security gate malfunctioned was
the sole legal cause of his injury.39 Similar reasoning was used in Fowler v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., holding that a visitor's negligence
in jumping from a balcony after the homeowner negligently locked him out there
with two whiny children was the sole legal cause of his injury.39
C. Using Duty/Risk Reasoning to Impose Full Liability, Thereby "Trumping"
Defendants' Particular Statutory-Language Arguments For Limited
Solidary Liability
When the comparative fault system first went into effect in 1980, Louisiana
Civil Code article 2324 provided for solidary liability among all tortfeasors
except those whose degrees of fault were less than the plaintiff's. Article 2324
was then amended in 1987 to restrict solidary liability. The 1987 version of
Article 2324 provided for full solidarity among intentional tortfeasors. 0 For
all other cases, it continued the provision that a tortfeasor whose degree of fault
is less than the plaintiff's has no solidary liability. And it added a new
restriction, stating that (aside from the intentional cases) "liability for damages
caused by two or more persons shall be solidary only to the extent necessary for
sees the gasoline, understands that it might bum if ignited by a match, and nevertheless throws a
lighted match into the gasoline. B is burned in the ensuing fire." The Restaters go on to indicate
that "the unforesecably egregious aspect of B's conduct-knowingly throwing a match on
gasoline-is ... relevant to the question of whether B's conduct was a superseding cause and,
consequently, whether A 's negligence was a legal cause of B's injuries." Then they punt: "Whether
a plaintiff's conduct constitutes a superseding cause is an issue that is beyond the scope of this
Restatement."
I am not sure that a Restatement on Apportionment should punt on such a fundamental
comparative-fault question. Here's my suggested solution to the Restatement hypothetical: If B's
conduct is such that an innocent bystander could not recover fromA-if a fire started by conduct like
B's was beyond the scope of the foreseeable risks that made it negligent for A to spill the
gasoline-then refusing recovery to B would be a sound application of "normal" legal cause
reasoning. Cf Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wy. 1985). But if an innocent bystander could
probably recover, then so must B, although B's recovery should be drastically reduced; the principles
of comparative fault call for assigning B a very high percentage, in order to reflect the egregiousness
of his fault.
Pure comparative fault systems handle egregious victim faultby assigning percentages, notby legal
cause reasoning. That is the simple sermon I am trying to preach here. But-continuing with the
spilled gasoline hypothetical-what of a victim who uses the gasoline to achieve self-immolation?
Here there is no apparent objection to a court's holding that opportunistic suicide--or indeed, any
willful self-injury-is outside the array of foreseeable risks created by the defendant's negligent
spilling of the gasoline. This would be a rule of law, not a technique for the selective barring of
recovery by ad hoc attributions of egregiousness, and there would be no inappropriate tension
between such a rule and the premises of the pure comparative fault system.
38. 663 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 680 (La. 1996).
39. 485 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 487 So. 2d 441 (La. 1986).
40. Intentional tortfeasors' solidary liability is treated in Section VII-A.
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the person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages." Touchard v. Williams4' read the quoted language to
mean that any tortfeasor 2 whose percentage of fault was equal to or greater
than the plaintiff's could be held solidarily liable for 50% of the recoverable
damages.43
Thus, the pre-1996 law included two limitations on the exposure of
tortfeasors (other than intentional ones) to solidary liability: a defendant with a
degree of fault lower than the plaintiff's could not be "bumped up," and no
defendant (with an individual assignment at 50% or lower) could be "bumped"
above 50%. I have not found an instance of the use of duty/risk reasoning to
transcend the first limitation, but the courts have sometimes used duty/risk
reasoning to override the second. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd.
held that the 50% limit on solidarity expressed in the 1987 version of Article
2324 did not prevent holding a landlord with lax security measures solidarily
liable with the rapist who took advantage of the lax security, basing its holding
in major part on the following principle:
[T]he scope of Southmark's duty to the plaintiff in this case clearly
encompassed the exact risk of the occurrence which caused damage to
plaintiff. As a general rule, we find that negligent tortfeasors should
not be allowed to reduce their fault by the intentional fault of another
that they had a duty to prevent.44
Similarly, in Lambert v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the supreme
court-in a per curiam opinion-held that the 50% limit on solidarity expressed
in the 1987 version of Article 2324 did not prevent holding a traffic tortfeasor
liable for 100% of the damages brought about by the combination of the traffic
tort and subsequent medical malpractice, reasoning as follows:
41. 617 So. 2d 885, 892 (La. 1993).
42. Footnote 3 of the Touchard opinion, 617 So. 2d at 887 n.3, might have been read to indicate
that only one tortfeasor could be "bumped up" to 50%. But that interpretation of the opinion made
no practical sense at all, and Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 982 n.6
(La. 1995), cleared up any possible confusion, stating: "This court in Touchard ... interpreted the
1987 amendment to La. Civ. Code art. 2324B as placing a fifty percent limitation on the solidary
liability of each negligent joint tortfeasor, as opposed to the previously existing one hundred percent."
43. Touchard expressed no view on the meaning of"recoverable damages." According to Maraist
& Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, supra note 1, at 292-93 & n.51, several courts ofappeal have held
that it meant total damages less any reduction for victim fault The authors cite Ehrrnan v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 653 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 655 So. 2d 343 (La. 1994), and Kramer
v. Continental Cas. Co., 641 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 648 So. 2d 402,403 (La.
1994). The current draft of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability
(Proposed Final Draft, 1998) indicates that a standard definition of "recoverable damages" is "the
amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled after damages for the injury are reduced by any
comparative responsibility of the plaintiff." Id. at § 20, Comment c.
44. 650 So. 2d 712, 719 (La. 1994).
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[T]he original tortfeasor's liability for 100% of the tort victim's injuries
is based on more than the imposition of a solidary obligation between
joint tortfeasors; his liability for 100% of the victim's damages results
because he is the legal cause of 100% of the victim's harm. The
amendment to Civil Code article 2324 has not changed this result."'
The supreme court reiterated this viewpoint in dictum in Turner v. Massiah,"
and similar reasoning was applied in Marceaux v. Gibbs47 to impose 100%
liability upon a jailer for harms done by an intoxicated escapee.
D. Using a "Ratio Approach " to Hold a Defendant Liable Above That
Defendant's Assigned Percentage or Above the 50% Cutoff Set Forth in
the 1987 Version of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324
We have just seen that the 1980 version of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324
stated that a tortfeasor whose fault is less than the plaintiff's "shall not be liable
for more than the degree of his fault" and that an additional limitation on
solidary was added in 1987, amending Article 2324 to include a 50% ceiling on
solidarity for non-intentional tortfeasors with individual assignments of 50% or
less. Generally speaking, the defense bar has insisted that both these provisions
ought to be interpreted to confine an affected defendant's liability to the specific
numerical percentage assigned by the trier of fact.4' The courts have not
always agreed. At times the courts have used or endorsed a so-called "ratio
approach" that has the effect of translating the percentage assignments made by
the initial trier of fact into higher percentages.49
45. 629 So. 2d 328, 329 (La. 1993).
46. 656 So. 2d 636, 640 n.3 (La. 1995).
47. 699 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1997).
48. The language limiting the tortfeasor whose fault is less than plaintiff's to his share used the
term "degree of his faule' whereas the 50% limitation was phrased as "fifty percent of [the]
recoverable damages." The defense-side argument has been that both provisions are keyed to the
numerical percentages assigned by the tier of fact.
49. In Solidary Liability in Tort I demonstrated the operation of the ratio approach with an
example in which the plaintiff's fault was 10%, the defendant's was 40%, and the plaintiff's
statutorily immune employer was 50%. In the law governing the example, it was improper to
attribute the employer's fault to either the plaintiff or defendant.
Under the ratio approach, the plaintiff's and defendant's relative degrees of fault become
controlling. When the fault of those parties is compared, we see that plaintiff's fault is
10/50ths (20 percent) and the defendant's is 40/50ths (80 percent). Plaintiff is thus
entitled to recover 80 percent of her damages from the defendant.
Note that the ratio approach yields an outcome that would not have been the first
preference of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Presumably the plaintiff would have
urged that defendant should pay 90 percent (thus charging the defendant with the
consequences of the employer's percentage). Presumably the defendant would have urged
that its liability was limited to 40 percent (thus charging the plaintiff with the consequenc-
es of the employer's percentage). The ratio approach charges neither party with the
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This "ratio" technique affected a defendant's "degree of [individual] fault"
argument in Guidry v. Frank J. Guidry Oil Co.," in which the trier of fact
assigned fault as follows:
Plaintiff: 45%
Defendant: 35%
Plaintiff's statutorily immune employer: 20%.
The court of appeal held that the fault percentages were factually appropriate but
that the employer's fault should not have been quantified. It then gave effect to
the trier of fact's assessment of the relative fault of plaintiff and defendant by
holding that plaintiff was responsible for 45/80ths of the damages and defendant
for 35/80ths (43.75%). The argument that the codal provision limiting a
defendant whose fault is less than the plaintiff's to "the degree of his fault"
meant that defendant could not owe more than 35% was rejected by the court of
appeal on the following basis:
This reapportionment of fault does not violate Article 2324 because it
merely reassigns negligence in a logical and fair manner to exclude fault
assigned to a statutorily immune entity not even a party to the suit.5'
Just as the ratio approach could sometimes have the effect of seeming to
alter the "degree of fault" limitation, it could also serve to hold a defendant with
a less-than-50% assignment to liability above 50%, thus effectively modifying
the 50% limitation that was introduced in 1987. In Gauthier v. O'Brien,52 the
court illustrated the proper application of the ratio approach with the following
hypothetical:
employer's percentage. Instead it distributes the employer's percentage between the
plaintiff and the defendant in proportion to their percentages of fault. Another way to
describe the ratio approach is to say that it is designed to yield the same outcome that the
trier of fact would probably have achieved if instructed to ignore the employer's fault and
to quantify the fault of only the plaintiff and the defendant. In the example, the trier of
fact believed that the defendant's fault was four times greater than the plaintiff's.
Presumably the trier of fact would have had much the same belief whether or not directed
to quantify the employer's fault.
Robertson, Solidary Liability in Tort, supra note 1, at 228-29.
50. 572 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), modified, 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991).
51. 572 So. 2d at 611-12. In the supreme court, the court of appeal's reallocation technique was
affirmed, but the supreme court disagreed with the factual assessments of fault, changing them to the
following:
Plaintiff: 10%
Defendant: 70%
Employer. 20%.
On those findings, the supreme court held that the judgment should hold the defendant liable for
70/80ths (87.5%) of the damages. The supreme court did not express a view on the propriety of the
court of appeal's handling of the defendant's "degree of fault"argument. 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991).
52. 618 So. 2d 825, 830 n.1l (La. 1993).
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Plaintiff: 0%
Defendant# 1: 40%
Defendant # 2: 20%
Employer: 40%.
The court stated that on those findings, Defendant # 1 would be liable for
40/60ths (66.67%) of the damages. A concurring opinion offered a second
example of the proper application of the ratio approach:53
Plaintiff: 20%
Defendant: 40%
Employer: 40%.
Under the ratio approach, this defendant, too, would be liable for 40/60ths
(66.67%) of the damages.
VI. CAN WE ExPEcr TO SEE ANY OF THE FOREGOING TECHNIQUES, OR
SIMILAR TECHNIQUES, APPLIED IN CASES ARISING UNDER THE 1996
LEGISLATION?
In their article titled Burying CaesarProfessors Maraist and Galligan have
analyzedthe prospects for post-1996 survival of several of the judicial techniques
discussed in Section V.' In this section, we will look at their (and my)
predictions for each of these techniques and examine the prospects for similar but
new techniques arising in the future.
A. Technique V-A
Maraist and Galligan believe the technique described at Section V-
A-whereby duty/risk reasoning sometimes forgave negligent plaintiffs--can be
no more.55 Here their reasoning centers on the change in the wording of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2323. Before 1996, it provided for victim-fault
reduction of recovery "when contributory negligence is applicable." Alston
Johnsone6 and others argued that this phrasing left it up to the courts to decide
the "when" question, thereby entailing the flexible duty/risk analysis. The
present version of Article 2323 omits the "when" phrase and addresses its
command to "any action for damages [in tort]," specifically including "any claim
for recovery ... under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability," thereby
seemingly closing the loophole.
53. See id. at 833 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
54. See Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1.
55. See id. at 381-82.
56. See Johnson, supra note 1.
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B. Technique V-B
Somewhat inconsistently (or so it seems to me), Maraist and Galligan predict
that the flip-side technique described at Section V-B-whereby duty/risk
reasoning sometimes served as a stand-in for the old contributory negligence
bar-remains viable. This prediction is made in a footnote, without extended
analysis, stating:
Of course, even under comparative fault there is the possibility that
plaintiff's negligence is a superseding cause relieving defendant of
liability. 7
As a matter of generic subject matter, the cited authority, Sofec, is horribly
apposite: it is an infamous instance of the use of legal cause reasoning-which
is synonymous with duty/risk reasoning-to reintroduce the contributory
negligence bar into what was supposedly a pure comparative fault system. (The
Sofec Court went so far as to approve a trial in which the plaintiff did not even
get to put on evidence of defendant's fault. In a bifurcated trial, the issue of
plaintiff's negligence was tried first. When plaintiff's employee was found to
have been egregiously at fault, judgment was entered for the defendant, whose
fault was never even examined.)
But Sofec, while generically apposite, is not a Louisiana authority. We
should examine the pre- and post-1996 legislation to see whether the changes
have eliminated or narrowed the loophole whereby victim negligence occasional-
ly serves as a total bar to recovery. The elimination of the former Louisiana
Civil Code article 2323 phrase "when contributory negligence is applica-
ble"--and the explicit expansion of Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 to "any
... legal doctrine or theory of liability"--should be as potent a loophole closer
here as with respect Technique V-A. This new language is as inimical to totally
barring negligent plaintiffs as to totally forgiving them.
Unfortunately, though, another 1996 change may give comfort to those who
might want to argue that courts have lost the freedom to forgive negligent
plaintiffs but are still quite free to bar negligent plaintiffs. The 1996 amendment
deleted from Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 a statement that "the claim for
damages shall not... be defeated" by victim fault. Nevertheless, Article 2323
continues to say that "the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in
proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable" to the plaintiff.
This affirmative command-to reduce on a percentage-fault basis-necessarily
implies a negative command-not to bar. Thus, on a fair reading of the new
Article 2323, it is no more hospitable to Technique V-B than to Technique V-A.
57. See Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 380 n.217 (citing Exxon Co.,
U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 116 S. C. 1813, 1817-18 (1996)).
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C. Technique V-C
Here the key provision is Louisiana Civil Code article 23243), the meaning
of which is clarified and in a sense delimited by Louisiana Civil Code article
2324(A) and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C). By virtue of
the 1996 legislation, Article 2324(B) seems to have lost the flexibility that
sometimes allowed courts to use duty/risk reasoning to hold particular defendants
to a liability higher than their assigned percentages. Former Louisiana Civil
Code article 2324(B) applied its limits on solidary liability to situations in which
"damages [were] caused by two or more persons," and neither it nor the then-
versions of Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 and Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1812(C) required courts to consider all putative tortfeasors,
including nonparties to the lawsuit in question, as among the "persons" covered
by the provision." Moreover, Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B) included
an explicit proviso--"[except] as otherwise provided by law"--that was
potentially as big as conscientious courts should believe it needed to be.
To Maraist and Galligan,59 the post-1996 provisions seem designed to
eliminate the flexibility.6 Article 2324(B) no longer has the phrase "as
otherwise provided by law." Both Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(A) and
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C) now seem to make clear that
the phrase "damages caused by two or more persons" comprehends all situations
in which the defendant and some other culpable person contributed to the
injuries, regardless of the other culpable person's nature, identity, or even lack
of identity.
D. Technique V-D
Under the pre-1996 legislation, the ratio approach was sometimes used as a
way of bracketing and disregarding percentage-fault findings against entities
whose fault (the courts felt) should not be charged to either the plaintiff or the
defendant. Now that the legislature has spelled out that everyone's fault should
be quantified and (for the most part) charged to the plaintiff, there would seem
58. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C) has a checkered past, which is rehearsed
in Cavalierv. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975,979-80 (La. 1995). In brief: (a) The
1980 version (then numbered Article 181 1(3)) said nonparty fault "shall" be quantified. (b) A 1983
amendment changed "shall" to "may." (c) A 1984 supreme court opinion, in dicta, said that "may"
nevertheless meant "shall." Lemire v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 458 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1984).
(d) A 1985 amendment directed the Law Institute to change the commentary that had led the court
to say that"may" meant"shall." (e) The 1996 change went back to "shall," fortifying the command
with other language.
59. See Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 404-09.
60. I tend to agree with Maraist and Galligan about the legislature's probable intentions, but
would note in passing that the courts may find it necessary to preserve Technique V-C in order to
avoid the conclusion that the 1996 version of Article 2324(B) is unconstitutional under Article 1,
sections 2 (due process) and 22 (access to courts) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
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to be no further occasion for using the approach in that way.6' I believe that
Maraist and Galligan agree. 62
As was indicated in Section 13-B, the ratio approach itself is probably alive
and well, and will continue to be useful in situations in which the trier of fact
has attributed a percentage of the fault to a particular party or entity and a
reviewing court has subsequently determined that the facts do not support the
attribution.
E. Other Techniques?
Maraist and Galligan are undoubtedly right in believing that the most widely
available technique whereby comparative-fault courts can do justice within the
constraints of the law will continue to be "the doctrine of comparative fault
itself."3 In their view, it has always been important-and under the relatively
rigid post-1996 legislative regime will now be doubly so-for courts to arrive
at percentage assignments to the parties and other entities in a way that is
sensitive to the culpability of the various actors, the nature of their causal
contribution to the injuries, the nature of the various duties owed by the actors,
the law's reasons for imposing those duties, the need for doing significant justice
to the victims of tortious conduct, and the need to maintain significant deterrent
pressure against both intentional malefactors and undue risk-takers. Of course,
inasmuch as juries are the principal decision-makers in assigning percentages of
fault, the contribution of judges and lawyers to this process will necessarily be
indirect. Here we might perceive a paradox at the heart of the 1996 legislation.
Whereas its philosophy and spirit are strongly and avowedly anti-flexibility and
pro-control, among its effects will doubtless be a shift of emphasis (and thus of
ultimate decision-making authority) from the judiciary to the jury.
This is not to say that the combination of lawyers' ingenuity and trial
judges' zeal for justice" will not invent new legal techniques for avoiding
perceived unfaimess and undue harshness. At this stage, no one can predict the
number or nature of these new techniques, but only their inevitability. Here,
solely for purposes of illustration, we will merely mention two possible
arguments for giving more victim-friendly interpretations to the 1996 legislation
than may be apparent on its face. 5
61. But see supra note 60.
62. See Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 397-401.
63. Id. at 407.
64. Certainly I don't imply that appellate judges don't also have a zeal for justice. My point is
that the flexibility-importing techniques awaiting invention will have their most vigorous life
and-for the most part-their inception at the trial-court level.
65. In Malone & Johnson, supra note 1, § 371, at 23 (Supp. 1998), Johnson notes (in what seems
to be a surprised tone) that the 1996 legislature's enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1104
is neither "pro-employer" nor "pro-business" but "in some small way... pro-claimanL" Other pro-
claimant or pro-victim messages in the 1996 legislation are more difficult to spot, but they may
nevertheless be found there if the search is vigorous enough.
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One such possibility may be found in the configuration of the new Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C). Subsection (1) says that defendants'
fault "shall" be quantified; Subsection (2) says that nonparty tortfeasors' fault
shall be quantified "[i]f appropriate under the facts adduced at trial;" and
Subsection (3) says that the victim's negligence shall be quantified "if appropri-
ate." No matter how strongly one might suspect that the difference in phrasing
is the product of legislative inadvertence, i.e., hasty draftsmanship, it is certainly
now open to plaintiffs in particular cases to argue that the difference in phrasing
permits the court to entertain policy arguments against submitting particular
victims' negligence to juries. Whether such arguments will be success-
ful-whether, for example, they might be "trumped" by the first sentence of the
new Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(A)-is a story for another day.""
A second such possibility arises from the fact that Louisiana Civil Code
article 2324(A) calls for solidary liability among those who "conspire[] with
[other persons] to commit ... intentional or willful act[s]." "Willful" is a term
with no clear definition, but the Maraist and Galligan treatise is surely correct
in suggesting that it is one of several terms-including "wanton," "reckless," and
"grossly negligent"67-- that "denominat[es] a ... level of fault somewhere
between intent and negligence.""'  Reading Louisiana Civil Code article
2324(A) to impose solidary liability among reckless or grossly negligent
tortfeasors is thus plausible on the face of the article,69 even though this would
arguably expand the provision's reference beyond the intentional tort field to
which it may formerly have been confined.
66. There is a pretty good argument that the first sentence of Louisiana Civil Code article
2323(A) does not encompass plaintiffs' fault. As Justice Kimball's opinion pointed out for the court
in Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. 1994), the Louisiana
comparative fault statutes "all share a common characteristic: '[they all] use the term "fault" when
referring to tortfeasor conduct and "negligence" when referring to victim conduct.' Nothing in the
1996 changes to the Civil Code altered this usage, although it should be noted that the 1987
amendment to Louisiana Civil Code article 2324-in language carried forward into the present
version-broke from the usage in its reference to the"fault of such other person,'including the person
suffering injury, death, or loss." On the view that the legislature has, with great (although not
perfect) consistency, used "fault" for tortfeasors and "negligence" for victims, the suggestion in
Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 380 n.217, that the second sentence of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(A) "may be superfluous," is possibly mistaken.
67. "Reckless" and "grossly negligent" are often usefully distinguished. See, e-g., ULA Model
Penal Code § 2.02(2Xc), indicating that recklessness includes an element of "conscious[ ] disregard[ ]
[of] a [highlyl substantial and unjustifiable" risk of harm. Gross negligence generally means conduct
that creates a highly substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm, without any requirement of conscious
disregard.
68. Maraist & Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, supra note 1, § 12-2, at 281. The authors point out,
though, that at least one court of appeal has stated that "willful" is a synonym for "intentional." Id.
69. In one version, the suggested argument might contend that"willful" tortfeasors are solidarily
liable for the plaintiff's total damages. A perhaps more plausible version might contend for solidary
liability for the plaintiff's recoverable damages, defined as total damages minus a reduction for victim
fault.
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VII. THE REMAINING PocKETs OF SOLIDARY LIABILITY
A. Intentional Tortfeasors
From 1870 until its amendment in 1987, the provision that is now Louisiana
Civil Code article 2324(A) provided:
He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or
encourages in the commission of it, it answerable, in solido, with that
person, for the damage caused by such act.
Since its amendment in 1987, the provision now reads:
He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or
willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage
caused by such act.
The original version was amply broad enough to impose solidary liability upon
all intentional tortfeasors. If one focuses on the new language of "conspira-
cy"-a word that normally means an agreement to commit an illegal act-the
new version may appear to be narrower than its predecessor.
The Maraist and Galligan treatise takes the "conspiracy" language as a
potentially serious restriction but emphasizes court of appeal decisions that have
continued under the new provision to impose solidary liability upon intentional
tortfeasors without regard to the existence of any conspiracy." The most vivid
example is probably Johnston v. Fontana,"' which used Article 2324(A) against
the participants in a spontaneous barroom fight. Maraist and Galligan's treatise
also points out that there is authority at the supreme court level for taking the
"conspiracy" language as having worked no change in the meaning of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2324 respecting intentional tortfeasors. The court's opinion
in Touchard v. Williams summarizes the 1987 changes to Louisiana Civil Code
article 2324 in these terms:
Judgment debtors are no longer exposed to solidary liability for 100%
of the judgment creditor's damages except where the joint tortfeasors
commit "an intentional or wilful act."72
Justice Hall's dissenting opinion in Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates,
Ltd. picked up on the above-quoted Touchard observation and added:
Although couched in terms of solidary liability of a person who
conspires with another to commit an intentional act, the underlying
essence and policy of the code article is that a person who commits an
intentional act is liable for the full extent of damage caused by the act.
Thus, the rapist in this case, if named as a defendant, would be
70. See Maraist & Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, supra note 1, § 12-2.
71. 610 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 618 So. 2d 407 (La. 1993).
72. 617 So. 2d 885, 891 (La. 1993).
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solidarily liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages, although the landlord's
solidary liability would be limited to 50%, assuming less than 50% fault
on the part of the landlord."3
Justice Hall went on to cite Johnston v. Fontana with approval.74
Clearly the interpretation endorsed by Justice Hall and others is better policy
than would be insistence on finding a conspiracy. The remaining question is
whether that policy can be squared with the language of the present Louisiana
Civil Code article 2324(A). I believe it readily can be. First, let's recall that
Louisiana Civil Code article 3506, setting forth general definitions of terms and
principles of statutory construction applicable throughout the Civil Code, states
in subsection 2:
The singular is often employed to designate several persons or things;
the heir, for example, means the heirs, where there are more than one.
Article 3506(2) is thus persuasive authority for reading Louisiana Civil Code
article 2324(A) to state:
Those who conspire with other persons to commit intentional or willful
acts are answerable, in solido, with those persons, for the damage
caused by such acts.
Conspirers, it says, are solidarily liable with committers. And it also says that
conspirers are solidarily liable with other conspirers and committers with other
committers. With the gentle assistance of Louisiana Civil Code article 3506(2),
the meaning of Article 2324(A) thus seems quite plain: its thrust is to bring
conspirers under the realm of solidarity, not to cut committers out. Reading
Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(A) to require the presence of at least
one conspirer would ignore the teaching of Louisiana Civil Code article
3506(2).
B. Torifeasor Employee and Vicariously Liable Employer
The Louisiana jurisprudence has long been settled that employers are
vicariously liable for the torts of employees that occur in the course and scope
of the employment. 5 Moreover, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3291(A)
conflns and reinforces that jurisprudence by providing in pertinent part that
"every master or employer is answerable for the damage occasioned by his
servant or employee in the exercise of the functions in which they are em-
ployed." Nothing in the 1996 legislation purports to change this rule: clearly,
vicarious liability has been preserved.
73. 650 So. 2d 712, 723 n.5 (La. 1994) (Hall, J., dissenting).
74. 610 So. 2d 1119. He also cited approvingly to Galligan, Discombobulating, supra note 1,
at 560-62.
75. See generally Maraist & Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, supra note 1, Chapter 13.
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A close corollary of the rule of vicarious liability has been the rule that the
tortfeasor employee and the vicariously liable employer are solidary obligors. 6
By focusing carefully on the language of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B)
keying the limitations on solidarity to instances of "damages caused by two or
more persons," Maraist and Galligan's "Burying Caesar" makes a convincing
demonstration that the 1996 legislation cannot reasonably be read to have
eliminated the employer's and employee's solidary liability.
77
C. Tortfeasor and Tortfeasor's Liability Insurer
The law has long recognized that a tortfeasor and his liability insurer are
solidary obligors.78 On reasoning broadly similar to that used by Maraist and
Galligan to demonstrate the preservation of solidarity in the vicarious liability
situation, it seems clear that solidarity has been preserved here, as well.
VIII. TORT INDEMNITY, CONTRIBUTION, AND SETTLEMENT CREDIT
A. Tort Indemnity
The Maraist and Galligan treatise indicates that general principles of tort
indemnity-whereby one tortfeasor (the "indemnitee") can shift the entirety of
its liability to the plaintiff onto another tortfeasor (the "indemnitor")-may have
been applicable under pre-1996 Louisiana law in three situations: (1) when the
indemnitee was vicariously liable for the indemnitor's tort; (2) when the
indemnitor's fault "triggered" the strict liability of the indemnitee; and (3) when
the indemnitee's fault was merely "passive" and the indemnitor's was "ac-
tive." 9 In their Burying Caesar article, the same authors indicate that "the
doctrine of tort indemnity is more or less a dead letter" after the 1996 legisla-
tion.8" Let us briefly examine each of the three indemnity situations to see
whether and why the "dead letter" designation is apt.
Allowing a vicariously liable employer to get indemnity from the tortfeasor
employee was said by the court in Dusenbery v. McMoran Exploration Co. to be
bad public policy:
It is doubtful that indemnity would be allowed to [a vicariously liable]
employer against an employee for simple negligence, since such
recovery is contrary to the very purpose of imposing vicarious liability
76. See Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981).
77. See Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 402-03.
78. Carona v. State Farm Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1984), and Hoefly v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982), recognize solidarity even between a tortfeasor and
the victim's uninsured motorist carrier.
79. Maraist & Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, supra note 1, at 301.
80. Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 409.
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on an employer who benefits from the services of the employee in the
course of his employment.8"
Moreover, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3921(A) provides in pertinent part:
[E]very master or employer is answerable for the damage occasionedby
his servant or employee in the exercise of the functions in which they
are employed. Any remission, transaction, compromise, or other
conventional discharge in favor of the employee, or any judgment
rendered against him for such damage shall be valid as between the
damaged creditor and the employee, and the employer shall have no
right of contribution, division, or indemnification from the employee
nor shall the employer be allowed to bring any incidental action...
against such employee.82
The probable intent of Louisiana Revised Statues 9:3921(A) was to wholly
eliminate employee-employer indemnity. But if the italicized clause is read as
limited by the first part of the sentence-a reading that is indicated by the syntax
of the provision-then the provision fails to deal with the situation in which the
victim pursues only the employer and neither sues nor settles with the employee.
On the other hand, nothing in the provision's syntax requires that reading; the
italicized phrase can also be read as a stand-alone command. On the latter
reading, the provision eliminates employer-employee indemnity in all situations.
Particularly in light of the expression of policy by the Dusenbery court, the
statute should and probably will be read as everyone believes was intended.
Maraist and Galligan tie the demise or near-demise of indemnity in the strict
liability "trigger" situation to the demise of strict liability itself. They thus
suggest that the only predictable remnant of indemnity in the "trigger" situation
may operate to indemnify a dog owner whose strict liability is brought about by
the negligence of one whom the owner has engaged to look after the dog.
It is not clear that Louisiana law ever recognized the passive/active version
of tort indemnity, and there is some authority that any negligence of the putative
indemnitee will defeat an indemnity claim, even as against an intentional
tortfeasor8 3 There seems no good reason for any such restriction. In the
hypothetical case analyzed in Section III of this article, why should Aaron be
protected from an indemnity claim by Drug Store? Similarly, when a liquor
provider is held liable for harms done by a drunk driver, why shouldn't the
provider be able to seek indemnity from the perpetrator? This matter may not
have enough practical importance to justify a lengthy debate, becauseperpetrators
81. 458 So. 2d 102, 104 n.1 (La. 1984).
82. La. R.S. 9:3921(A) (1997) (emphasis added).
83. See Thompson v. Cane Garden Apartments, 480 So. 2d 373, 374 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that an apartment building held liable for negligent security measures could not get
indemnity from the criminal who exploited the poor security to rob and injure the building's tenants).
1998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
like Aaron and drunk drivers are frequently judgment-proof and thus not worth
pursuing by either the victim or the cotortfeasor. But I see nothing in the 1996
legislation-and no other clear doctrine-that would prevent recognition of an
indemnity right in these situations, and would hope that Maraist and Galligan's
"dead letter" prediction turns out to be wrong here.
B. Contribution
The basic principle of contribution is that any tortfeasor held liable to the
victim for more than that tortfeasor's individual share of the responsibility is
entitled to turn to the other tortfeasors and insist that each of them pay over its
full individual share. Conversely, contribution is not necessary and therefore not
available on behalf of any tortfeasor whose liability to the victim is confined to
that tortfeasor's individual share.
Under the 1996 legislation, most tortfeasors' exposure will be limited to
their individual shares, so that the incidence of contribution litigation will have
been drastically reduced. But-mostly for the sake of argument-I would claim
that Maraist and Galligan may go a bit too far in stating that, post-1996,
"contribution is of little or no importance." 4  Remember that intentional
tortfeasors-andperhaps "willful" ones-can still be held beyond their individual
shares, so that we can expect to see some contribution-seeking by such actors.
I can't predict how such claims will fare. As was suggested in Section II-
B, intentional tortfeasors ought not to be able to get contribution from "merely"
negligent ones, and perhaps not even from one another. At this point, we don't
even know what a "willful" tortfeasor is, much less whether such tortfeasors will
be liable beyond their individual shares or entitled to contribution from other
tortfeasors.
C. Settlement Credit
When the victim settles with and releases a tortfeasor who would have owed
contribution to another tortfeasor, the settling tortfeasor is insulated from any
contribution claim and the remaining tortfeasor can assert the contribution claim
against the victim in the form of a credit against liability's The credit is
measured by the settling tortfeasor's percentage of fault, just as that tortfeasor's
liability for contribution would have been measured. To claim the settlement
credit, the remaining tortfeasor must establish the existence of the settlement, the
settling tortfeasor's liability (but for the settlement) to the victim, and the settling
tortfeasor's percentage of fault."
84. Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 409.
85. The seminal case is Harvey v. ravelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
86. Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hosp., 634 So. 2d 331 (La. 1994); Taylor v. United States Fidelity
& Guar., 630 So. 2d 237 (La. 1993); Raley v. Carter, 412 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1982).
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Nothing in the 1996 legislation has altered these basic principles. However,
the number of situations in which they will arise has been drastically curtailed.
Few defendants will be in a position to claim settlement credit because few
defendants will be exposed to liability beyond their individual percentage shares
of the fault. To the extent that nonparty tortfeasors' fault will routinely be
quantified and charged to the plaintiff, defendants will be unconcerned with
whether the plaintiff has settled with any of the tortfeasors. In effect, defendants
will be getting settlement credit without having to ask for it. All they'll need to
ask for is the quantification of everyone's fault.
IX. RETROACTIVE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1996 LEGISLATION?
Louisiana Civil Code article 6 provides that "[i]n the absence of contrary
legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only" whereas
"[p]rocedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively,
unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary." Keith v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co."' held that the first sentence of the new Louisiana
Civil Code article 2323-calling for the quantification of the fault of nonparty
tortfeasors-is procedural and applies to require courts to quantify the fault of
the plaintiffs statutorily immune employer in cases arising before the amend-
ment's effective date (April 16, 1996). Justice Knoll's opinion for the Keith
court did not directly address the retroactive applicability of the changes to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B), and Chief Justice Calogero wrote a
concurring opinion to emphasize that the latter question remains open. After a
period of uncertainty, during which the courts of appeal were divided on the
retroactive applicability of the amendments to Article 2324(B), 8 the supreme
court held against retroactivity in Aucoin v. State.9
Maraist and Galligan-writing in the interval between Keith and
Aucoin-had strongly opposed retroactive application of the new Article
2324(B), pointing out that while "the mere allocation of fault may be procedural,
what one does with it is substantive."' 9 Using the 1996 legislation retroactively
to charge the fault of employers or other nonparty tortfeasors against the
plaintiff's recovery would clearly have been a substantive application, and hence
87. 694 So. 2d 180 (La. 1997).
88. At one time, a panel of the Second Circuit was on record as approving retroactive application
of the 1996 amendment to Louisiana Civil Code article 2324. But the Second Circuit then changed
its mind and in a five-judge reheiring in Jones v. Hawkins, 708 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998),
held that "the 1996 amendment to art. 2324 is substantive and prospective only." See also Moore
v. Safeway, Inc., 700 So. 2d 831, 835 & n.19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Jackson v. Town of
Grambling, 690 So. 2d 942, 945 n.4 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997); and Thomhill v. State Dep't of Transp.
& Dev., 676 So. 2d 799, 809 n.14 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied sub nom. Riley v. State, 683 So.
2d 272 (La. 1996).
89. 712 So. 2d 62 (La. 1998).
90. Maraist & Galligan, Burying Caesar, supra note 1, at 410.
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precluded by Louisiana Civil Code article 6.91 Moreover, there is a long line
of supreme court decisions holding that a personal injury cause of action is a
vested right that cannot be retroactively impaired without violating both state and
federal constitutional provisions.' Justice Knoll's opinion for the Keith court
had referred approvingly to that line of cases, stating:
[S]ince the [retroactive] application of legislative enactments has
constitutional implications under the due process and contract clauses of
both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, even where the
Legislature has expressed its intent to give a substantive law retroactive
effect, the law may not be applied retroactively if it would impair
contractual obligations or disturb vested rights.93
Under those principles, it would have been unconstitutional to apply the 1996
legislation to charge a plaintiff whose case arose prior to its enactment with the
fault of an employer or other nonparty tortfeasor. (Aucoin turned solely on
Louisiana Civil Code article 6 and thus did not reach constitutional consider-
ations.94)
Integrating Keith and A ucoin in cases arising before April 16, 1996, is
slightly tricky. One must retroactively apply the new regime's procedural
features only. Suppose the hypothetical case analyzed above in Section III arose
before 1996 and is being tried today. Keith calls for assigning fault to everyone,
just as we did in Section Ell. But Aucoin precludes charging Porter, the victim,
with anyone's fault other than his own. Thus, on the findings the jury made in
Section In-damages of $100,000, Aaron guilty of an intentional tort, Drug
Store a negligent tortfeasor with fault of 10%, and Porter himself guilty of 10%
negligence-the judgment should provide that Aaron and Drug Store are
solidarily liable for $50,0005 and that Aaron is individually liable for another
$50,000.
91. Socorro v. City ofNew Orleans, 579 So. 2d 931, 944 (La. 1991), held that any enactment that
"has the effect of changing the law regarding the amount of damages recoverable in personal injury
lawsuits" is "clearly substantive as opposed to merely procedural." Egros v. Pempton, 606 So. 2d
780, 786 & n.10 (La. 1992), held that the 1987 amendment to Article 2324-which also had the
effect of changing the law regarding the amount of damages recoverable in personal injury
lawsuits-was substantive in nature and applicable only prospectively.
92. See Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 723 (La. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 n.1 (La. 1992); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1063-64 (La.
1992); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 308 (La. 1986); Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Med.
Found. Hosp., 470 So. 2d 878, 879 (La. 1985); Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521, 524 (La. 1979);
Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1387 (La. 1978).
93. 694 So. 2d at 183.
94. See 712 So. 2d at 67-68.
95. Holding Drug Store for 50% is supported by either of two distinct lines of reasoning. First,
liability of 50% is the result that would be reached under the ratio approach of Gauthier v. O'Brien,
618 So.2d 825 (La. 1993), provided one assumes that Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc., 650
So.2d 712 (La. 1995), would militate against the assignment of percentage fault to an intentional
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X. CONCLUSION
Perhaps frustrated by what some would regard as judicial inhospitality to the
1987 revision of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324, the 1996 legislature came
forth with a radical truncation of tort victims' rights. Whether the truncation
will prove as radical in practice as it looks on paper depends on a complex set
of behaviors and interactions among lawyersjurors, trial judges, appellate courts,
and future legislatures. Maraist and Galligan's "turf war" metaphor is apt
enough,96 and so is Leon Green's magisterial description of tort law's seemingly
relentless pendulum movement: "Creation and destruction will continue to go
hand in hand as they have done from the beginning, and thus the schizophrenic
balance of love and fury will be maintained." '97 On the other hand, it may be
best to close on a quieter note, to be continued....
tortfeasor in this situation. On that view, the only two percentages that count are plaintiff's 10% and
Drug Store's 10%-equal fault, hence a 50150 split. Second, in any event 50% is plainly the right
answer under Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993), which held that principles of
solidarity justify "bumping up" a defendant like Drug Store to 50% but no higher.
96. See Maraist & Galligan, Turf War, supra note 1.
97. Leon Green, No-Fault: A Perspective, 1975 BYU L. Rev. 79, 80 (1975).
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